high (group means range from 38% to 79%). As a consequence, the mean image score of the players increased from the first round on and reached a total average of The donors' decisions were also influenced by their own the latter is that helping someone or refusing to do so image score: in 11 of 12 groups, donors with a low image has an impact on one's reputation within a group. This score were more likely to donate something and thereby reputation is constantly assessed and reassessed by improve their own image score than donors with a relaothers and is taken into account by them in future tively high image score ( Figure 1B ; effect of giving or social interactions. Generosity in indirect reciprocity not giving: F 1,99 ϭ 217.2, p Ͻ 0.0001; interaction with can evolve if and only if it eventually leads to a net group: F 11,99 ϭ 2.9, p ϭ 0.003). benefit in the long term. Here, we show that this key Overall, players with a high mean image score earned assumption is met. We let 114 students play for money more money in the indirect reciprocity game than playin an indirect and a subsequent direct reciprocity ers with low image score ( Figure 2A ). This is largely game. We found that although being generous, i.e., because the mean payoff per group increased with the giving something of value to others, had the obvious groups' average generosity (r ϭ 0.93, n ϭ 12, p Ͻ 0.0001), short-term costs, it paid in the long run because it and both less generous ( Figure 2B ) and more generous builds up a reputation that is rewarded by third parties players ( Figure 2C ) profited from this group effect. Within (who thereby themselves increase their reputation). A groups, the correlation coefficients between the players' reputation of being generous also provided an advanmean image score and their final account ranged tage in the subsequent direct reciprocity game, probafrom Ϫ0.78 to ϩ0.52 and was, on average, not signifibly because it builds up trust that can lead to more cantly different from zero (one-sample signed rank test, stable cooperation. p ϭ 0.57). Building up a high image score has immediate costs Results and Discussion that were apparent in the first few rounds of the indirect reciprocity games ( Figure 2D ). However, the donors' tenTwelve separate groups of university students each dency to reward high image scores increasingly complayed three different sessions. The first session, a repensated for the costs of building and maintaining these peated simultaneous two-player Prisoner's Dilemma high image scores. From the tenth round on, the correla-[10, 22] (PD; a direct reciprocity game) was a practice tion coefficient between image score and account was session only. From then on, the students played for positive in sign, and, in the last rounds of this session, money. The second session was an indirect reciprocity this positive correlation was statistically significant (Figgame. There are several ways to implement a reputation ure 2D). that corresponds with the degree of generosity [14, 15, 17, 23, 24]. We chose to use an image score [14, 18] that was graphically displayed. In the third session, the Carry-Over Effects to the Direct students played the PD again but with the important Reciprocity Games modification that their last image score from the indirect Players who won the direct reciprocity game, i.e., who reciprocity session was displayed. Given that a reputareceived the additional £5.00 reward, had on average a tion of being generous may build up trust [25], this last higher mean image score during the indirect reciprocity session was to test whether the generosity displayed in game than players who did not win (Figure 3 ; F 1,112 ϭ indirect reciprocity is rewarded in subsequent direct 8.15, p ϭ 0.005). The analogous pattern could be obreciprocity games.
Figure 3. The Mean Image Score during the Indirect Reciprocity Game of Winners and Losers of the Subsequent Direct Reciprocity Game
The image scores plotted here are residuals (means Ϯ SE) that correct for round effects (as in Figure 1 ). scribed in Figures 2B and 2C . Generous players played more cooperatively in the PD game if their partner was generous than if he/she was not (paired t test, t 63 ϭ than players with a low image score (multiple regression on mean image score, with P cc , P cd , P dc , and P dd as pre-3.22, p ϭ 0.002), and they achieved higher payoffs when playing with generous rather than nongenerous partners dictors: F global ϭ 2.50, d.f. ϭ 4, p ϭ 0.047). This was mainly because players with high image score played higher (t 63 ϭ 3.21, p ϭ 0.002). The same was true for nongenerous players who were also more cooperative (t 48 ϭ 2.87, P cc (r ϭ 0.19, p ϭ 0.028) and higher P dc (r ϭ 0.20, p ϭ histories of giving or not were displayed with these arrows before each interaction. We played 24 rounds per group. Each player played Experimental Procedures once per round as donor and twice per two rounds as receiver. To examine the potential impact of information about the players' Participants and Experimental Setup current accounts [29, 30] , the accounts were displayed through the The subjects were biology students, mainly first year undergradugame for seven groups but were only displayed at the end of the ates (53% females), who were asked to voluntarily sign in for experisession for the remaining five groups. mental dates. They had never heard about indirect reciprocity in
In the third session, each player played six PD games like those their courses at the University of Edinburgh. We tested them in in the first session. During these games, both the players' final image groups of nine or ten. They were told that they would play anonyscores from the second session were displayed on the screen. The mously and that their total earnings would be paid out in a way that players with the five highest mean payoffs per group received £5.00 would not reveal their identification number (ID) to us or to their each, in addition to their earnings from the second session. colleagues [18] .
Each subject chose a plug to connect an opaque box to an impenetrable tangle of cables, chose a seat within opaque partitions that Acknowledgments separated the players from each other, and placed their hands in their box in which they could secretly push two different buttons.
We 
